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pedient that new principles corresponding with actual corporate prac-
tice be introduced. If the president is the chief executive officer of a
corporation, the courts should take judicial notice of his status without
the necessity of his authority being proven by one who has relied on
it in an ordinary transaction with him. The highly complex business
world of today has cast upon the president new and more extensive
powers which the courts should recogmze as being within an extended
scope of authority In other words, when one s name is put on corpo-
rate stationery as its president, where an office at the principal place
of business has his name on the door with the word "president" added,
and where he appears to be something more than a mere figurehead,
the public should be protected in dealing with him, at least as to the
ordinary everyday business of the corporation.
CuA=s GROMEY
RE-EXAMINATION OF THE RIGHT OF AN OFFICER TO
KILL A FLEEING SUSPECTED FELON
The statement that an officer of the law is justified in killing a
fleeing felon if it is otherwise impossible to prevent his escape appears
frequently in the Kentucky decisions.' The question arises as to
whether the decedent must have been a felon in fact in order to justify
such a homicide. Another way of stating the question is, should an
officer be justified in killing a fleeing innocent person or a mere mis-
demeanant on the officer s proof that he had reasonable cause to be-
lieve his victim was a felon? The issue may arise under two different
circumstances: (1) where no felony has been committed, but the
officer had reasonable grounds to believe that such a cnme had been
committed and that the fleeing person was the suspected felon; (2)
where a felony in fact has been committed, but the officer mistook
the fleeing person for the felon.
The question was treated at length in companion notes, previously
published in the JoxRnNAL,2 wherein opposing views were advocated
and authority cited in support of the respective positions. It is felt that
"The view has been taken that to justify such a killing a major felony must
have been committed. See 88 Ky. L.I. 619 (1950). However, this is not a subject
for treatment herein. For an interesting discussion on the distinction between
major and minor felonies, see Commonwealth v. Emmons, 157. Pa. Super. 495, 48
A. 2d 568 (1945).
'Notes, 88 Ky. L.J. 609 and 88 Ky. L.J. 618 (1950).
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these companion notes represent an extensive research of the early
cases and authority on the subject, and, therefore, it is believed that
a further discussion of these early cases and authorities is unnecessary
The case of Petrie v Cartwright,3 decided in 1902, established the law
in Kentucky to the effect that where no felony has m fact been com-
mitted, an officer cannot justify the killing of a fleeing innocent person
or mere misdemeanant, however reasonable hIs belief might have been
that his victim was a felon. The case of Johnson v Williams Adm r,4
decided m 1901, laid dovn the Kentucky law applicable to the cir-
cumstance where a felony has in fact been committed. The case held
that to justify the killing, the officer must show not only that a felony
had been committed, but also that his victim was the felon. The
holdings of these two cases were not questioned in either of the above-
mentioned companion notes on the subject.
Thus, inasmuch as the Petrie case and the Johnson case were the
first cases to lay down the Kentucky view on these two issues, the dis-
cussion herein will be confined to case authority subsequent to these
decisions, and the primary purpose will be to ascertain what the law
in Kentucky is today in each instance. For purposes of convenience,
the problem will be discussed separately under the above cases.
a. Petrie v Cartwright.
In the Petrie case the police officer had reasonable grounds to
believe that a felony had been committed, and upon seeing decedent
fleeing, shot and killed him. There had been no felony committed,
and the court, in holding the officer liable on his bond, stated that
the only way to justify the killing was to prove that a felony in fact
had been committed. In recognition of its importance, the Petric case
was published in both the LAWYERS REPORTS ANNOTATED5 and AmEmI-
CAN STATE REPORTS." The Petrie case was reaffirmed by very strong
dictum in 1915 in Mylett's Adm r v Burnley,7 where the court said:
"However, an officer is not justified in killing one in order to effect
Ins arrest or prevent his escape on mere suspicion that he has com-
mitted a felony. In such a case he acts at his peril, and can justify
only on the ground that a felony has been committeol."'
The latest Kentucky case on the subject is Young v Amis,° decided
a114 Ky. 10:3, 70 S.W 279 (1902).
'111 Ky. 289, 63 S.W 759 (1901).
59 L.R.A. 720.
'102 Am. St. Rep. 274.
716:3 Ky. 277, 173 S.W 759 (1915).
'Id. at 280, 173 S.W at 760.
"'220 Ky. 484, 295 S.W 431 (1927). The fleeing person was wounded but
did not die; nevertheless, the officer was held liable since no felony had been
committed.
KiNTucKy LAw JouRNAL
in 1927 There the Petrie case was explained at length and unequivoc-
ally approved. The precise issue in the Petrie case has not come be-
fore the Kentucky Court since the Young case.
The case of Martin v Commonwealth,o decided in 1935, has been
thought by some to be authority for the proposition that Kentucky
might be abandoning the view laid down in the Petrie case.i" In the
Martin case, the brother of the deceased was beating another person
with steel knucks and the deceased was standing by protecting his
brother with a gun.12 The court said:
"If Ola were using metallic knucks on Sid with malicious intent to
wound or kill Sid, then Ola was committing a felony, and Orville, by
using Ins pistol to protect Ola, shared in the commission of that
felony."'3
While the phrase, "If Ola were using metallic knucks with
malicious intent to wound or kill .," might lead one to believe that
the court was in doubt as to whether a felony had actually been com-
mitted, it is submitted that there was not only sufficient evidence to
prove the commission of a felony, but that the court came to the con-
clusion that a felony had been committed, and thus the officer was
justified in killing deceased. 14 However, in defining the officer s duty,
the court said:
"Martin had seen the fight and he certainly bad
reasonable grounds to believe a felony had been committed; then it
became Is duty, even without a warrant, to arrest the suspected
felon. It then became the duty of Martin and the officers with
htum to use such force as was necessary to effect his arrest, and it was
their duty not to allow him to escape, and when his escape ap-
peared probable, these officers were authorized to kill him rather than
let him escape, and the killing was 3ustifiable. "L
Do these remarks by the court mean that an officer may fire upon a
fleeing person on reasonable belief that the fleeing person is a felon,
when in fact he is not and, further, no felony has in fact been com-
mitted? Such a rule would be directly contrary to the rule in the
Petrie case. But the court, prior to these remarks, having concluded
that felony had in fact been committed, makes these remarks some-
thing less than mere dictum. This language was unnecessary in de-
ciding the case and serves only to mislead. Its use was very un-
fortunate.
-°257 Ky. 591, 78 S.W 2d 786 (1935).
" Note, 38 Ky. L.J. 618, at 622 (1950).
" The malicious beating of another with steel knucks is a felony. Perry v.
Commonwealth, 286 Ky. 587, 151 S.W 2d 377 (1941).
"257 Ky. 591, 592, 78 S.W 2d 786, 786 (1935).
It might well be argued that whether or not Ola was using metallic knucks
was a proper question of fact for the jury.
"257 Ky. 591, 593, 78 S.W 2d 786, 786 (1935).
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It might well be argued that since these remarks were made in
the light of the fact that a felony had been committed, the court in-
tended to lay down the rule that even where an officer believes that a
felony has in fact been committed he should not fire unless his belief
is a reasonable one. As a practical matter, under the rule of the
Petrie case, inasmuch as the officer who fires upon a fleeing person
does so at his peril if his victim is not a felon in fact, it is submitted
that the officer should not only reasonably believe that the fleeing per-
son was a felon, but, in fairness to himself, he should know that such
was the case. The contention of the writer is that the court concluded
that a felony was in fact committed in the Martin case, and thus the
case is not contrary to the Petrie case.
The case of Bailey v Commonwealth16 has been thought by some
as having "taken this jurisdiction [Kentucky] entirely away from the
view as expressed in Petri, v Cartwright.""' In the Bailey case, the
deceased requested the officers to arrest a certain person with whom
lie had been fighting. Deceased had been drinking. The officers re-
fused and told him to get a warrant. He returned with a shotgun and
demanded that the officers go with him. The officers asked him to
lower his gun and went toward him to arrest and disarm him. He
did lower the gun, but it discharged as he did so, striking one of the
officers in the foot. He unbreached his gun and ran toward some
parked cars, and before he reached the cars the officers fired upon and
killed him. In commenting upon these facts, the Court said:
"He fired first. The shot may or may not have been fired accidentally.
In either event Trusty had refused to surrender the gun upon the
request of the officers; he had it cocked and pointed in their direction;
and was backing away from them when it was discharged. He un-
breached the gun and started runmng toward some parked cars.
Under the circumstances it was not only their right but the duty of
the officers to shoot Trusty if it became necessary to do so to take um
into custody. They had every right to believe that Trusty intended to
continue the affray from behind the parked cars. He did not sur-
render his gun and was preparing to reload it. The officers had not
only the right to protect themselves, but the shooting having been
committed in their presence it was their duty as peace officers to use
whatever force they deemed necessary to take Trusty in custody.""I
The cases of Collins v Commonwealth's and Partin v C ommon-
wealth2" were cited as authority for the rule above quoted. The
facts in both cases were identical and the holdings were the same.
'-310 Ky. 731, 221 S.W 2d 693 (1949).
'7 Note, 38 Ky. L.J. 618, at 623 (1950).
.310 Ky. 731, 783, 221 S.W 2d 693, 694 (1949).
192 Ky. 412, 283 S.W 896 (19211.
'197 Ky. 840, 248 S.W 489 (192.3).
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For this reason, only the facts of the Collins case will be given. De-
ceased had committed a misdemeanor m that he was drunk m a pub-
lic place. The officer, while m the course of effecting his arrest, was
fired upon by the misdemeanant, whereupon the officer shot and killed
him. In laying down the applicable rule of law where an officer is
fired upon in the course of arresting a misdemeanant, the court stated:
"The correct rule is that, where an officer is attempting to arrest one
charged with a misdemeanor, and the one so charged resists arrest,
and either shoots or shoots at [Italics Writer s] the officer, there is a
felony committed in the presence of the officer, and he is then author-
ized to arrest the accused upon the felony charge without a warrant,
and in making such arrest is given all the protection provided by law
to officers in making felony arrests; and it is the duty of the officer
in making such arrest to use such force as may be necessary to over-
come such resistance, even to the taking of the life of the accused,
and it matters not that the officer may not, at the time, be in danger
of losing his life or limb at the hands of the accused."'
In the Bailey case, the deceased was guilty of a misdemeanor in
that he was drunk and armed with a deadly weapon. The officer was
fired upon while effecting the arrest. If it be argued that deceased did
not shoot or shoot at the officer, the fact remains that the officer was
shot. This fact cannot be lightly brushed aside. While the court's
statement of facts leaves much to be desired, it is submitted that the
court treated the case as though a felony had been committed. To
strengthen the position that the court proceeded on the assumption
that a felony had been committed, the cases of Collins and Partin are
not without import. These cases were heavily relied upon by the
court in support of its decision, and both involved the commission of
felonies. One may disagree with the court in its conclusion that a
felony had been committed, nevertheless, any criticism of law, which
is the primary aim of this note, must be based upon the court's in-
terpretation of the facts, and not on facts as they actually existed.
It is readily seen that the court in the Bailey case was tinking in
terms of self-defense when it used the phrase, "The officers had not
only the right to protect themselves," and m terms of the right to kill
to effect the arrest of a felon when it said, "but the shooting having
been committed in their presence it was their duty as peace officers
to use whatever force they deemed necessary to take Trusty in
custody"
The court laid down the rule in the Collins and Partin cases that
where a misdemeanant fires upon an officer who is attempting to arrest
him, the officer is entitled to a self-defense instruction and also an in-
='192 Ky. 412, 416, 233 S.W 896, 898 (1921).
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struction that an officer may kill a felon if necessary to effect his
arrest. It is believed that the court was merely reaffirming this rule
in the Bailey case.
While the Bailey case is right in result since a felony had been
committed, and thus as a matter of law the officers had the right to
kill if necessary to effect the arrest of the felon, it is submitted that
the court erred m ruling as a matter of law that the officers were justi-
fied in killing deceased m self-defense. Clearly, this was a proper
question of fact for the jury
Since a felony was committed m the Bailey case, no analogy can
be drawn to even compare it with the Petric case.
The argument has been made that since an officer has the right
to arrest a suspected felon on reasonable suspicion, he should likewise
be permitted to fire upon a fleemg suspected felon on reasonable
suspicion. The fallacy of this argument is quite apparent. In the
case of mistaken arrest, only the freedom of movement has been im-
paired. The infringement on the-person s liberty is reparable. How-
ever, when the infringement is upon life itself, no reparation is pos-
sible. An action for wrongful death falls far short of restitution.
There is no way in which the victim can be made whole again.
Unquestionably the case of Petrie v Cartwright remains the un-
shaken law of Kentucky today, with all of its import. It is believed to
be a sound view It lays down a rule of law which reaffirms the right
of every person to live without fear of becoming the victim of a cir-
cumstance for which he was not responsible.
b. Johnson v Williams Adm r
In the Kentucky case of Johnson v Willians Adrnr, the officers
had a warrant for the arrest of Dave Browder, for murder. They set
a trap for his capture, but an innocent person was mistaken for
Browder and was killed by one of the officers. The court, in holding
the officer liable, said:
"The law which gives an officer the right to kill an
escaping felon certainly requires lum to know that he is the felon, not
an innocent party, whose life he is attempting to take."'
The Johnson case is not only a landmark case in the Kentucky law,
but it has been given broad recognition in other jurisdictions. The
case was published in the LANzits REPoRTS ANNOTATED23 and ANMI-
ICAN STATE REPoRTs.2 4 A parallel factual situation was again presented
*Johnson v. Williams Adm r, 111 Ky. 289, 297, 63 SAV 759, 761 .(1901).
-" 54 L.R.A. 220.
" 98 Am. St. Rep. 416.
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to the Kentucky appellate court in the case of Watson v Common-
wealth,''5 decided in 1936. There, in reaffirming the rule laid down in
the Johnson case, and with specific reference to it, the court said:
"That case was published in 54 L.R.A. as well as in 98 Am. St.
Rep., and it is cited in many later texts upon the question, written
since that case was decided. We have searched all available sources
and have found no adjudication or text statement contradicting that
excerpt. It was bottomed upon our then conclusion, and which we
now approve, to the effect that a modification of that rule whereby
an arresting officer in the circumstances might excuse himself from the
consequences of such mistaken identity would be an extremely danger-
ous one and could easily be employed to shield and protect him from
any revengeful action that he might take toward the injured person
and be relieved of the consequences thereof.'
If an officer with a warrant for a felon, as was the situation in both
the Johnson and Watson cases, cannot justify the killing of an in-
nocent person based on reasonable grounds that his victim was the
felon, by the stronger reason he should not be permitted to justify
killing when acting without a warrant. It is submitted that the Ken-
tucky Court has laid down a sound rule, supported by sound reasoning
and authority If an officer were permitted to justify the killing of an
innocent person on the mere grounds that a felony had been com-
mitted and he had reasonable grounds to believe that his victim was
the felon, any reasonably suspected person, however innocent, could
became a lawful victim.
In conclusion, it should be noted that the rules laid down in the
Petrie and Johnson cases are invoked primarily for the protection of
innocent persons and society as a whole. The very basis of the com-
mon law rule, allowing an officer to take the life of a fleeing felon,
rested on the theory that since all felonies were punishable by death,
then if only the life of a felon had been forfeited, no net harm had
been done.27 This reasoning lends support to the suggestion that it is
not so much whether a felony has been committed as it is whether the
person is the one who committed it, and thus subject to be killed if
he attempts to escape. It is, therefore, not a question of finding a
justification for the officer, by showing that he acted reasonably, but
- 263 Ky. 72, 91 S.W 2d 1018 (1936).
" Id at 79, 91 S.W 2d at 1021.
' "With the coming of statutory provisions doing away with the death penalty
for felomes, the tendency should logically be to restrict officers to the right to kill
to cases of felomes punishable capitally." Note, 38 Ky. L.J. 609, 616 (1950).
Whether or not the fleeing person is a felon should no longer be the test,
since all felomes are not punishable by death. The officer should be limited to
killing a fleeing person only when such person is guilty of having committed a
major felony which normally causes or threatens death or serious bodily harm.
The Restatement of Torts subscribes to this view. RESTATEMENT, TORTs, SEC. 131.
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the question is, was the deceased guilty of having committed a felony,
which would justify the surrender of his own life? Thus, the question
of justification of the officer should be addressed to the innocence or
guilt of his victim, and not to whether the officer acted reasonably
The prinary objection to permitting an officer to kill on his reason-
able belief that his victim was a felon is the abuse which would result
from such a rule. The officer could always show that he had reasonable
grounds to suspect the commission of a felony and that he had reason-
able grounds to believe his victim was the felon, and it would in effect
be left entirely to him to say whether he was proceeding against a
misdemeanant or a felon. Such a principle would not only be in
derogation of the common law rule permitting an officer to kill a
fleeing felon only, but would virtually give an officer the right to fire
upon anyone who flees in the -course of an attempted arrest. A law
that will permit of such abuse in its enforcement would result in more
evil than good, and must necessarily be rejected in any Society 2
8
It has been argued that if officers were permitted to fire upon
fleeing suspected felons, criminals would more readily submit to the
law enforcement officials. The writer questions the soundness of this
argument. The average criminal has little knowledge of the law with
all of its ramifications. Consequently the precise provisions of the law
have little effect on the criminal's submission to it. On the other hand,
if the law were extended to permit an officer to kill on reasonable
suspicion, it would definitely open wider the avenues to abuse by
officers, while having practically no effect as a deterrent for preventing
criminals from fleeing.
The rules laid down in the Petrie and Johnson cases conform to the
above reasoning, and leave no doubt as to what the present state of
the law is in Kentucky An officer, before firing upon a fleeing person,
had better know, not only that a felony has been committed, but that
the fleeing person is the felon.
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"The sacredness of human life is so great that an officer should resort to
killing only when to let the felon escape would potentially cause grave harm to
society. 'With this limitation, an officer would not have occasion to kill for any
crime less than felony. In the event there is doubt as to whether or not a felony
has been committed, it is submitted that the crime will not have been committed
with such violence as to warrant the taking of life. Where a felony has been
committed and there is the slightest doubt as to the guilt of the suspected felon,
it is submitted that society Aill suffer less by the temporary escape of the suspect,
even if guilty, than it would by killing him and thereby incumng the risk of
killing an innocent person. The placing of these restrictions on an officer would
not do violence to the generally recogmzed rule that an officer, in order to justify
killing one fleeing in the course of arrest, must prove that the person killed was a
felon, but it would have the important effect of discouraging the taking of life in
the absence of absolute necessity." Note, 88 Ky. L.J. 609, 617 (1950).
